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FORUM
Witness May Testify Against
Spouse
by Brad Sures
On February 27, 1980, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that a witness spouse alone has the privilege
to testify adversely. In Trammel v. United States, No.
78-5705 (U.S., filed Feb. 27. 1980), the Court agreed
that the modern justification for the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony is no longer valid, that the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony is vested in
the witness-spouse alone, and that the witness may be
neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.
In March of 1976, Otis Trammel was indicted for im-
porting heroin into the United States. The indictment
alleged that he and his wife, Elizabeth Ann Trammel flew
from the Philippines to California in August 1975, car-
rying heroin. On November 3, 1975, Elizabeth Trammel,
while boarding a plane in Thailand, was searched and
four ounces of heroin were found on her person. She was
arrested and after being told that she would not be prose-
cuted for her role in a conspiracy if she would testify
against her husband, she agreed to cooperate with the
Government. Prior to his trial, Otis Trammel notified the
District Court that he wished to assert a privilege to pre-
vent his wife from testifying. The District Court ruled that
only confidential communications between husband and
wife were held to be privileged and inadmissible. Testi-
mony concerning any act observed during the marriage
and any communication made in the presence of a third
person would be admissible, however. Primarily on the
basis of his wife's testimony, Otis Trammel was convicted.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 583 F.2d 1166.
In Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), there
was a similar issue of whether there exists a privilege
against adverse spousal testimony in the federal courts.
There, a unanimous Court held the wife's testimony in-
admissible because "the law should not force or encour-
age testimony which might alienate husband and wife, or
further inflame existing domestic differences." Id. at 79.
Thus, the rule in Hawkins was that one spouse cannot
testify against the other unless both consent. In so ruling,
however, the Court was not foreclosing "whatever
changes in the rule may eventually be dictated by 'reason
and experience.' " Id. at 79. Thus, the door was left ajar
for future consideration concerning the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony. In Trammel, the door was
taken right off its hinges.
Writing the opinion for the Court in Trammel, Chief
Justice Burger gave three basic reasons why the Hawkins
privilege should be abated. First, when Hawkins was
decided, 31 states allowed an accused a privilege to
prevent adverse spousal testimony. Now, only 24 states
allow this privilege. Thus, the trend in state law has been
toward divesting the accused of the privilege to bar
adverse spousal testimony. (In Maryland, the witness-
spouse alone may assert a privilege against adverse
spousal testimony. MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§9-
101, 9-106 (1980).)
Second, no other testimonial privilege sweeps so
broadly. "The privileges between priest and penitent,
attorney and client, and physician and patient limit pro-
tection to private communications." Trammel v. United
States, supra at 11. The Hawkins rule, on the other hand,
is not limited to confidential communications. It permits
an accused to exclude all adverse spousal testimony.
Third, the ancient foundations for so sweeping a priv-
ilege, established when a woman was regarded as chattel
and denied a separate legal identity, are well behind us.
The contemporary justification for affording an accused
such a privilege, i.e., to preserve marital harmony, is also
unpersuasive:
When one spouse is willing to testify against the other
in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-
their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is
probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve.
Id. at 12. Therefore, allowing the privilege would prob-
ably do more "to frustrate justice than to foster family
peace." Id. at 12.
Thus, Chief Justice Burger concluded in Trammel that
the witness spouse alone has the privilege to refuse to
testify adversely. Such testimony is admissible even
where the witness spouse testified only after a grant of
immunity and assurances of lenient treatment.
While eight of the justices agreed with this rationale,
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, stated that the
reasons for the privilege had disappeared well before
Hawkins was decided in 1958. Therefore, to argue that
the privilege's disappearance occured "in the few years
that have elapsed between the Hawkins decision and this
one" was incorrect. Id. at 2 (concurring opinion).
Chief Justice Burger argued that the privilege against
adverse spousal testimony set forth in Hawkins had be-
come outdated and may be changed if dictated by reason
and experience. The only change since Hawkins cited by
the Chief Justice, however, is that seven of the thirty-one
states that had allowed an accused a privilege to prevent
adverse spousal testimony in 1958, now no longer afford
the accused such privilege. All of Burger's other reasons
were also valid in 1958 when Hawkins, in a unanimous
decision held the privilege to be valid.
This case was brought by the United States in a federal
court. Surely, the actions of seven states in promulgating
laws entitling the witness-spouse alone to assert the priv-
ilege, or abolishing the privilege in criminal cases
altogether over a period of 22 years, is not sufficient
reason and experience to dictate a reversal of the unani-
mous Court's holding in Hawkins. Since Burger was un-
willing to state that Trammel overturns Hawkins outright,
his rationale will be deemed weak and poorly reasoned,
even if the effect of his opinion is accepted without further
challenge.
Real Estate Brokers May Be
Guilty of Sherman Act
Violations
by Edwin Bayo
In an opinion announced January 8, 1980, McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, 100 S. Ct. 502, the
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act ex-
tends to an agreement among real estate brokers in a
given market area to conform to a fixed rate of commis-
sions on sales of residential property. A broker's commis-
sion is usually stated as a percentage of the sales price.
The average rate on sales of residential property is be-
tween five and seven percent.
Petitioner's main claim in District Court was that re-
spondent brokers had engaged in a price-fixing conspira-
cy in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act by
means of an agreement to adopt a uniform rate of com-
missions on sales of residential property. To establish the
requisite interstate commerce component necessary for
jurisdiction under the act, petitioners claimed that the
brokerage activities of respondents "were within the flow
of interstate commerce and have an effect upon that
commerce." McLain, supra at 506. In support of this, it
was alleged that respondents assisted persons moving in
and out of the state in buying or selling houses, and that
they also assisted clients in securing financing and title
insurance from sources out of state.
Both parties and the District Court agreed that Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), is the
controlling precedent. In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court
held that Section One of the Sherman Act had been
violated by conformance with a bar association's mini-
mum fee schedule which provided for a title search fee of
one percent of the value of the property. Although the
title search was a purely local activity, it was a prerequisite
to obtaining financing and title insurance. Since a signifi-
cant amount of funds for financing the purchase of homes
came from out of state, the Court stated: "Given the
substantial volume of commerce involved and the in-
separability of this particular legal service from the inter-
state aspects of real estate transactions, we conclude that
interstate- commerce has been sufficiently affected."
Goldfarb, supra at 785.
In applying the rationale of Goldfarb to the present
case, the District Court held that petitioners could estab-
lish federal jurisdiction only by showing that a 'substan-
tial' volume of interstate commerce was involved in the
overall real estate transaction and that the broker's ser-
vices were an essential, integral part of the transaction,
inseparable from the interstate aspect. Since a real estate
broker is not indispensible or necessary in order to buy or
sell a house, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Sherman
Act jurisdiction did not exist because petitioners had failed
to demonstrate that real estate brokers are either neces-
sary or integral participants in the interstate aspects of
residential real estate financing and title insurance.
The Supreme Court held that the complaint should not
have been dismissed at this stage of the proceedings. "To
establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act
violation it would be sufficient for petitioners to demon-
strate a substantial effect on interstate commerce gener-
ated by respondents' brokerage activity. Petitioners need
not make the more particularized showing of an effect on
interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to
fix commission rates, or by those other aspects of respon-
dents' activity that are alleged to be unlawful." McLain,
supra at 509. The Supreme Court disagreed with the
restrictive interpretation of Goldfarb given by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals. The Court stated
"[t] he Goldfarb holding was not addressed to the 'effect
on commerce' test of jurisdiction and in no way restricted
it to those challenged activities that have an integral re-
lationship to an activity in interstate commerce." McLain,
supra at 510.
McLain is the latest case in a long line of cases uphold-
ing the broad authority of Congress to regulate activities
that, while local in nature, have an effect on interstate
commerce. Whether this holding will mean monetary
savings to those who employ the services of a real estate
broker in selling or buying a house remains to be seen.
